· IRT is gradually supplementing CTT as a method of devising and modifying scales. · With IRT, we can construct scales that are shorter, but as or more reliable, than with CTT. · However, IRT requires us to learn a new set of terms and techniques.
I f there is one theme that has permeated our culture over the past century, it is that bigger is better-hamburgers that surpass the mouth's ability to encompass them; sport-utility vehicles that can easily transport Jumbo the elephant; and remote controls that require reading a 75-page manual just to find out how to turn the television on. However, spurred on by health warnings, gas price increases, and baby boomers who have increasing difficulty reading fine print, this trend may be reversing, replaced by the mantra, small is beautiful. This same trend exists in creating scales to measure constructs such as anxiety, depression, pain, coping, and the like. Previously, the longer the scale the better, because longer scales were usually more reliable, and better reliability translates into better validity. 1 Over the past few decades, though, this received wisdom has been challenged by a new technique called IRT, which promises shorter scales that are as, if not more, reliable than longer ones. 2 In this article, we'll explore the basics of IRT and how it is revolutionizing the field of scale development.
Classical Test Theory
To understand how the rules have changed, it helps to know what the rules have been. In this case, they derive from what is called CTT, which has ruled the game for the past 70 years or so. One reason for its dominance is that its assumptions are relatively weak, meaning that they apply in most situations. 3 The primary assumptions are that the amount of error associated with any particular item is unrelated to the true score, and that if we add up the error terms for all of the items, the sum will, in the long run, be equal to zero. In practical terms, this means that the more items there are in a scale, the less random error will be associated with the total score. The upshot is that we now have scales that are reliable and valid, but relatively long-21 items on the BDI, 4 and 57 items on the depression scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II, 5 for example. These may not seem overly long, but when given in conjunction with other scales, they can add significantly to the test-taker's burden.
For the past 70 years, test development has been dominated by what is called classical test theory (CTT). However, there are many problems associated with CTT, including: the resulting scales tend to be long; their interpretation is highly dependent on the normative sample; the assumption that each item contributes equally to the total score is often wrong, as is calculating a single index of measurement error for all possible scores; and it is difficult to equate different tests developed using CTT. Recently, a new approach to scale development has appeared, called item response theory (IRT), which overcomes all of these problems and, in certain cases, results in a scale with true interval-level properties. This article is an introduction to IRT. It concludes by discussing why IRT hasn't been adopted more widely, and some of its limitations.
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However, there are some problems associated with CTT, in addition to its resulting in long scales. The first is sample dependency. This means that the psychometric properties of the scale are dependent on the sample in which the scale was tested. We have often raised the admonition that reliability and validity are not intrinsic characteristics of a measurement tool, but are an interaction between the scale and the sample. 1, 6 Consequently, if the scale is to be used with a different population, it must be renormed, and the psychometric characteristics determined for that new group. Similarly, any change to the instrument, such as the removal or addition of items, requires a reevaluation of the test's properties. Another implication of sample dependency is that there is a circular dependency between the scale's characteristics and those of the sample: how much of a trait people have depends on the test; and the norms of the test depend on how much of the trait the people in the sample have. We can't totally ignore sample characteristics in IRT; if everyone has either a lot or a little of the attribute we're measuring, nothing can compensate for the information we don't have at the other end of the scale. But, as long as the entire range of trait is sampled, then the distribution doesn't matter, as it does in CTT.
The second problem with CTT is the assumption of item equivalence: that all of the items contribute equally to the total score, or that the total score is simply the sum of the individual items. Adding up the items to create a total score presents another difficulty: we assume that the items are measured on an interval scale (that is, the increase between, say, a score of 1 and a score of 2 means the same as the increase between 7 and 8), and they rarely, if ever, are. In CTT, we deal with this problem in a not-overly sophisticated manner-we cover our eyes and hope it will go away (which it never does).
A third problem involves the standard error of measurement (SEM). Very briefly, the SEM can be defined as how much people's scores would change on repeated administrations of the scale because of its unreliability. In CTT, we have one SEM for the whole scale. We know this isn't right-scores at the extremes usually have more error associated with them than scores in the middle of the range-but it's the best we can do. So, we'll all cover our eyes yet again, and play let's pretend.
Item Response Theory
The solution to these difficulties can be found in IRT. As with many developments, different people were working on the problem simultaneously; in this case, Birnbaum 7 in the United States and Rasch 8 in Denmark. The 2 weak assumptions of CTT are replaced by 2 hard assumptions in IRT: that the scale is unidimensional (that is, it measures only one trait or attribute); and that, at any given level of the trait, the probability of endorsing one item is unrelated to the probability of endorsing any other item (a property called local independence). In actuality, it's unusual to encounter local dependence outside of achievement tests (that is, those that assess how well a person knows a subject), so it's rarely an issue. Unlike the weak assumptions of CTT, the hard assumptions are more difficult to meet, but you violate them at your peril; if they're not met, the results of the IRT analysis are meaningless.
If a scale meets these 2 assumptions, then we can draw an ICC for each item. Let's start off easy, and deal with items that are answered on a dichotomy, such as true or false or yes or no; later, we will talk about items that allow more response alternatives. In Figure 1 , the ICC shows the relation between the amount of the trait (denoted by the Greek letter theta, q), and the probability of endorsing the item. There are a few points to note about the ICC. First, q is expressed very much like a standardized score; it has a mean of zero, and a standard deviation of 1. If the trait that we're measuring is depression, then someone who is more depressed than average has a positive value of q, and a negative score means that the person is less depressed than average. The second thing to note is the shape of the curve. The technical name for it is a logistic function; at the low end, increases in the trait result in only small increases in the probability of endorsing the item; and the same is true at the high end. In the middle, though, small increases in q produce relatively large increases in the likelihood that a person will endorse the item. If we draw a horizontal line from the 50% probability mark to the ICCs, and then drop a line down to the x axis, we note a third property-the 2 items differ in terms of difficulty (a term that is a holdover from IRT's origins in achievement testing). Item 2 is harder than Item 1, because you need more depression to endorse the item; that is, Item 2 taps more serious depression than does Item 1. Because the curves in Figure 1 differ from each other only in terms of difficulty, this is called the 1PLM.
There are 2 other points to note about the ICCs in Figure 1 . One is that when the trait has a value around -3q, the probability of endorsing the item is very close to zero. The other point is that the curves are parallel; they don't differ from each other in terms of their slope, reflecting the assumption in the 1PLM that all of the items discriminate equally. But, neither of these are absolute requirements of IRT. First, we can relax the requirement that the curves be parallel, as in Figure 2. As the curves can now differ in 2 respects-the difficulty and the slope-this is referred to as the 2PLM. The slopes reflect the discrimination ability of the item. Item 2 has a steeper slope than Item 1, indicating that it is a better discriminator, because the transition from not endorsing the item to endorsing it is more acute. Thus there is less ambiguity about the meaning of a response-nondepressed people don't answer it and depressed people do. Ideally, the curve would be perfectly vertical, but that's rarely seen.
The 3PLM does away with the requirement that the curve has to bottom out at a probability level of zero. This is called the guessing parameter, because it allows for the fact that if a person is unsure of an answer, he or she may guess at the right response. Even though there may be some guessing that takes place in mood and personality scales, we rarely use the 3PLM outside of achievement testing. For the most part, mood and personality scales are constructed or modified using the 1-or 2PLM.
The ICCs that we've discussed so far apply to dichotomous items. In fact, the original 1PLM, called the Rasch model, was developed for this type of question, and it is a very useful technique. But, the real beauty of IRT is in its application to items that are answered on a continuum, such as adjectival scales (for example, none, somewhat, a lot, a great deal) or Likert scales (for example, strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree). In CTT, we handle these items by continuing to play the game of let's pretend. In this case, the pretending is that the responses are equally spaced along the continuum, so that the amount that the trait increases as we move from strongly disagree to disagree is the same as the increase between disagree and neutral (that is, an interval scale). This allows us to blithely add up the responses to all of the items to arrive at a total score. With IRT, though, we can actually see if the response options are equally spaced and, even more importantly, whether they're all useful.
In Figure 3, with one response option to the next. For example, for values of q less than -1, the most probable response is strongly disagree; people whose q levels are between -1 and -0.2 are most likely to answer disagree; and so on. It can be seen from this diagram that the options aren't equally spaced along the trait continuum; the strongly disagree, neutral, and strongly agree options seem to include more people than the disagree and agree ones. We get even more information if we plot the response curves for this item, as in Figure 4 . This shows the probability of giving each response for different values of q. At any point along the x axis, the sum of the probabilities is 1.0, because there is a 100% probability that the person will select one of the options. This figure tells us that the respondents choose either the extreme options (strongly agree and strongly disagree) or the neutral category, but not agree or disagree. That means that we should either reduce the number of options to 3 or, if we want to maintain 5 choices to be consistent with other items, we should combine agree with strongly agree, and disagree with strongly disagree when we score this item.
Another very useful bit of information we can derive with IRT is called DIF. Strictly speaking, if IRT is truly independent of the sample, then everyone should respond similarly to each item. However, there are times when the assumption breaks down, and the response depends not only on q but also on some other dimension as well. For example, remember those math questions from school: One train is travelling east at 50 km/hr. On the same track, another train is travelling west at 80 km/hr. If they start off 500 km from each other, how long will it be until they crash?
The ability to answer this question correctly depends on a person's ability in math (which is good), but is also a function of reading ability (which is bad, because it isn't what the test is supposed to measure). Within the context of IRT, DIF allows us to tell whether different groups respond to each item similarly, or if Stro ngl y agr ee there are differences in terms of difficulty or discriminating ability. This is very useful if we want to see if the items on the original and translated versions of a scale are performing equivalently. If a difference emerges, it may point to either problems in the translated item, or cultural differences that affect how people respond to the content of the items. 9 We can also use DIF if we want to select items that are answered similarly by men and women, or by other groups of people.
Finally, we can test the fit of each item. Fit statistics tell us 2 things: whether the items truly form a unidimensional scale; and where on the q scale each item belongs. Usually, before we do an IRT analysis, we factor analyze the items to test for unidimensionality. Ideally, what we will find is a very strong first factor, on which most of the items load (although no one quite knows what a very strong first factor actually means). Even so, there may still be items that really don't belong because they're not on the same dimension, and the fit statistic will flag them as a second check. Be careful, though; unidimensionality can be a slippery concept to pin down. Needless to say, if we're developing a scale to measure anxiety, for instance, we wouldn't want to include items that tap other constructs, such as demoralization or ego strength. But, is anxiety itself uni-or multidimensional? As you have probably gotten tired of hearing me say, it all depends. What it depends on is how finely we want to measure it, and for what purpose. If we were simply interested in screening people for the presence or absence of anxiety, we would likely look upon-and try to measure-it as a single dimension. However, if we wanted to know how different people experience anxiety, we may want to break anxiety down into its various components: physiological, behavioural, and cognitive symptoms. Now anxiety would be seen as a multidimensional construct, and we would develop 3 subscales, and have each of them unidimensional. So, the degree of unidimensionality that we want to achieve depends on the purpose of the scale; there are no iron-clad rules that would pertain in all situations.
Being able to use the fit statistics to place the items along the q continuum is useful for many purposes. Let's say that after we run the program, we find that the 10 items in our scale, denoted by the letters A through J, are distributed as in Figure  5 . What we would like to end up with are a small number of items that span the entire continuum and are about equally spread out along it. First, we see that items B and H have the same difficulty level, so we don't need both. Deciding which one we delete could be as simple as flipping a coin, or selecting the one that has better face validity, or (if we're using the 2PLM) the one with the better discriminating ability. Similarly, items G and A are fairly close to one another, so we may decide one isn't necessary. Second, the scale has many items that are easy; that is, endorsed by people who have relatively low levels of the trait; and fewer more difficult items. We also see a large gap between items E (with a level of q just above 1) and I (just below 3). We may want to devise items with moderate difficulty levels to plug that gap, and give us some more difficult ones. In this way, we accomplish 2 goals: devising scales that are shorter than those derived using CTT; and ensuring that the entire span of the trait is covered. By removing redundant items and those that detract from unidimensionality, IRT has been used to shorten existing scales, while still retaining-and in some cases, actually improving-their psychometric properties. 10 So, how many items are required to adequately cover the domain? Would you be surprised if the answer is, It all depends? I did not think so. How closely spaced the items should be is related to how the scale will be used. Some scales are used as screening instruments; for example, they may be given to patients in a family practitioner's office to determine if a more thorough investigation is needed, or to survey respondents to see if a section of a diagnostic questionnaire should be given. This was done with the Canadian Community Health Survey: Mental Health and Well-Being, 11 for instance; those who endorsed a few key items about anxiety, depression, or substance abuse were then asked a more extensive series of questions to determine whether a disorder was actually present, while these more lengthy modules were skipped for people who did not endorse the items. In this way, people who did not have a specific disorder were spared the need to answer a long string of inapplicable questions. In this case, the screening test need have only a few items, and they would be clustered around the threshold value for caseness, as this is the only region of the continuum we are interested in.
Conversely, if the scale is to be used to chart patients' improvement (or the lack of it) during treatment or as the result of some experimental intervention, we want a finer-grained tool, with the items spread out along the entire continuum. In fact, because IRT gives us the difficulty level for each item, it's a simple matter to construct different versions of the same scale, by selecting items that meet our different needs.
The Uses of IRT
One of the most useful aspects of IRT is its ability to construct scales that are short but still reliable and valid, whether we do that de novo for a new scale, or by eliminating redundant items from existing ones. But there are other ways IRT is helpful. One is called adaptive testing. We are all accustomed to taking tests, not only in class but also to get admitted to graduate or professional school, where we began with items that were so easy that they were laughable (at least to us), and then became so difficult that we feared for our future. The reason is that the test had to span the entire range of abilities of the test-takers, from those who have trouble filling in their name, to the know-it-alls who know it all. But, items that are far below or far above a person's ability level give us no useful information. The same is true for personality tests-items that tap low levels of the trait, such as introversion, are useless for people who have a lot of it, and vice versa. The most useful items are those near the middle, and these will vary from one person to the next. In adaptive testing, the test administrator (which may be a computer) takes a guess at the person's ability level, or selects an item whose q level is near zero. If this item is passed, then it is unnecessary to give easier items; conversely, if it is failed, it would only frustrate the person to give more difficult ones. So, by choosing items judiciously, only a small proportion of all potential items need be given. Because all of the items have a value along the same q continuum, people can be compared with one another even though they may each have taken a different subset of questions. This approach is now used with individually administered tests, such as the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, 12 which taps receptive language in people ranging in age from 2.5 to over 90 years, with many high-stakes licensing examinations, and is being adapted for personality questionnaires. 13
So Why Isn't IRT Used More?
Given all of these theoretical and practical advantages, it's fair to ask why scales are still being developed using CTT and why journals aren't replete with articles using IRT. In fact, some journals are, but they are restricted mainly to the fields of education and personnel selection; those devoted to personality assessment have precious few that actually used it. The reasons for this are manifold. First, and most importantly, we cannot ignore one of the most powerful determinants of human behaviour-inertia. Only within the last decade have there been a significant number of people who were taught IRT in graduate school. The rest were trained in CTT, and it takes a lot of effort to change our ways. (As one wag said, "Science changes one funeral at a time.") Second, CTT is much simpler to understand than IRT; there aren't formidable-looking equations with exponentiations, Greek letters, and other arcane symbols. It's easier to comprehend one number for the SEM (even if it's wrong) than to figure it out for each individual score. Third, and equally important, the most commonly used statistical software packages all have modules that allow us to use CTT without thinking (which is the way most people seem to use them), whereas IRT requires stand-alone, and often expensive, computer programs with a fairly steep learning curve. This is much like growth curve analysis was 5 years ago. Now that it is part of readily available packages, its use has also followed a growth curve, and more than likely, IRT will follow the same path.
Finally, although the 1PLM can be run with as few as 50 subjects if the items are all dichotomous, anything that complicates the model, such as using items with 3 or more response options or adding more parameters, increases the sample size considerably, far beyond what is needed in CTT or available in most settings.
However, the question remains whether IRT is really necessary in psychiatry and clinical psychology. Despite the admonition about the length of scales, in reality, they are quite acceptable outside of being used in community surveys. They are not like licensing exams, which could involve hundreds of items and are ripe for shortening. Also unlike high-stakes test situations, it would be highly unusual for an examinee to bring suit against an organization because the test wasn't normed properly, so the financial incentive to use IRT isn't present in clinical testing situations. Last, our scales are at best ordinal in nature. Strictly speaking, we cannot say that a difference in 4 points at the low end is equivalent to a 4-point difference in the middle or at the upper end, and we definitely cannot say that a score of 10 is twice as much as one of 5. The best we can do is rank order people on the basis of their scores-we know that a person whose BDI score is 15 is more depressed than someone whose score is 10. But, we have lived with these limitations for 80 years or so, and CTT yields sufficient information about items for us to develop scales that are good enough. The question remains whether being able to devise scales that truly are interval in nature and whose psychometric properties are perhaps better described is worth the effort.
My feeling now is that the disincentives to adopt IRT more widely, combined with the lack of a pressing need to do so, means that we will likely not see a sudden growth in its use. But, once programs become more widely available, cheaper, and easier to use, the balance will tip in the other direction and most new scales will be developed using this family of techniques.
